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ALFRED DUNHILL OF LONDON, INC. V. REPUBLIC OF
CUBA: THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE-ALTERING
THE SOVEREIGN'S NEW CLOAK
Power to regulate the foreign affairs of the United States is
distributed between the legislative and executive branches of the government by the United States Constitution.' In the arena of foreign
affairs, the resolution of international disputes is traditionally the
product of sensitive negotiations which are occasionally supplanted by
the application of political pressures and, in extreme instances, military force. 2 Disputes arising as a result of the acts of a foreign state
then are handled as a part of the foreign affairs powers in accordance
with the Constitution. Consequently, United States courts are normally
reluctant to exercise jurisdiction in these matters.
This reluctance has given rise to a judicially created rule, known
as the act of state doctrine. 3 The traditional statement of the doctrine
appears in Underhill v. Hernandez4 :
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence
of every other sovereign state, and the courts [of] one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of government of
another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances
by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means
open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.
Thus, where a foreign sovereign acts within its own territory, United
States courts will not sit in judgment of those acts, but will defer,
instead, to the prerogatives of the executive branch in the conduct of
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 10, I1 (Congressional power to regulate foreign
affairs); U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, which provides that the President
shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, providing two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls.
See generally L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 15-28 (1972).
2. See Leigh, Sovereign Immunity-The Case of the "Imias ", 68 AM. J. INT'L L.
280 (1974).
3. The doctrine is "judicially created to effectuate general notions of comity
among nations and among the respective branches of the Federal Government." First
National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 762 (1972), which will be
referred to in this Note as Citibank.
4. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
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foreign affairs. 5 The continuing vitality of the doctrine, therefore,
depends upon its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of functions
6
between the judicial and political branches of the government.
There are similar policy considerations behind the related doctrine
of sovereign immunity. Born of "respect for the 'power and dignity'
of the foreign sovereign," 7 the doctrine denies the courts of one state
jurisdiction over another sovereign state.' The grant of sovereign
immunity protects a nation-state and its property from suit or attachment instituted in another nation-state.
As a result of increased commercial activity by governments, 9 the
doctrine of sovereign immunity has been restricted to those acts of the
sovereign that are public in nature and unique to the exercise of
sovereign power. " A nation-state then may be sued by a private citizen
for breach of contract in a court in the United States. No immunity will
be granted the sovereign since contractual relationships are commercial or private in nature, and they are not unique to sovereign authority. I I There is no similar restriction in the United States act of state
doctrine. Consequently, tension exists between the doctrine of
sovereign immunity and the act of state doctrine in that a foreign
sovereign, not otherwise immune from suit for damages arising out of
its commercial activities, nevertheless may cloak itself with the protection of the act of state doctrine by declaring that its course of conduct
constitutes state action.
The United States Supreme Court recently encountered this predicament in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba. 2 In
3
its decision, the Court narrowed the scope of the act of state doctrine,'
and the plurality went further to propose, for the first time, the addition
of a commercial restriction to the act of state doctrine similar to the
commercial limitation to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 14
5.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 41 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW].

6. Banco Naciona] de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-28 (1964).
7. National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 362 (1955).
8. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, § 1604, 90 Stat.
2891 (1976) (to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1604). See generally RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW, supra note 5, at § 63.
9. See.generally Lauterpacht, The Problem of JurisdictionalImmunities of Foreign
States, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 220 (1951).

10. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, § 1605 (a)(2), 90
Stat. 2891 (1976) (to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(2)).
II. See H.R. REP No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976), reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604, 6605; Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria
General, 336 F. 2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
12. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
13. Id. at 695.
14. Id. at 706.
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This note will trace the history and development of the act of state
doctrine with relevant comparisons to the doctrine of sovereign immunity and concentrate on the Court's decision in Dunhill. The purpose of this article is to address the concern expressed in the minority
opinion in Dunhill, that a workable distinction between public and
private acts of the sovereign cannot be drawn. 15 It will be established
that such distinctions can be made and that future stability in international commerce depends to some extent upon the adoption of the
limitation proposed by the Dunhill plurality.
I.

ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE

ACT

OF STATE DOCTRINE

The respective case law enunciating both the act of state doctrine
and the doctrine of sovereign immunity has a common source 16 in the
case of The Schooner Exchange v. M'Fadden.'7 The Court in First
National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba8 explained that both
doctrines are "judicially created to effectuate general notions of comity among nations and among the respective branches of the Federal
Government." To that end, the act of state doctrine precludes any
review whatsoever by the courts of one sovereign state, of the governmental acts of another sovereign state performed within its own territo19
ry.
The act of state doctrine is not a principle of international law, 20
nor is it compelled by the United States Constitution. However, the
doctrine does have "constitutional underpinnings" in the concept of
separation of powers. 21 The act of state doctrine requires that the act of
15. Id. at 728 n.14 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
16. First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 762 (1972).
17. 1I U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). Chief Justice Marshall observed:
The arguments in favor of this opinion which have been drawn from the
general inability of the judicial power to enforce its decisions in cases of this
description, from the consideration, that the sovereign power of the nation is
alone competent to average wrongs committed by a sovereign, that the question to which such wrongs give birth are rather questions ofpolicy than of law,
that they are for diplomatic, rather than legal discussion, are of great weight,
and merit serious attention.
Id. at 146 (emphasis added).
18. First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 762 (1972).
19. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
20. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1964). See generally
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 5, at § 41.
21. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964):
The text of the Constitution does not require the act of state doctrine; it does
not irrevocably remove from the judiciary the capacity to review the validity
of foreign acts of state.
The act of state doctrine does, however, have "constitutional underpinnings". It arises out of the basic relationships between branches of government in a system of separation of powers.
Moreover, the "political question" foundation of the act of state doctrine that is inherent
in the separation of powers bears a similarity to the principles discussed in Baker v.
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the foreign state be accorded presumptive validity if the predominant
jurisdictional contacts are within that foreign state. 22 That is to say that
if the sovereign has acted within its own territory, the predominant
jurisdictional contacts necessarily will be with that state, and the
choice of law rules would require application of its law. 23 The act of
state doctrine in this regard, is a choice of law principle that demands
application of the law of the foreign state. 24 By contrast, the doctrine
of sovereign immunity is jurisdictional and does not reach the validity
or invalidity of the sovereign conduct. Moreover, sovereign immunity
can only be raised when the sovereign or "its agent" is a party
litigant.25 The act of state doctrine confers a more sweeping protection
by extending beyond the sovereign to protect private litigants whose
legal position is determined by the presumptive validity of the act of
state.
Underlying the application of the act of state doctrine, however,
is the principle of international comity that is articulated in Oetjen v.
Central Leather Co. :26
To permit the validity of the acts of one sovereign state to be
re-examined and perhaps condemned by the courts of
another would very certainly "imperil the amicable relations
between governments and vex the peace of nations."
A.

Application of the Doctrine in Sabbatino

Although the act of state doctrine surfaced in Underhill v. Hernandez,27 the factors to be considered in applying the principle were
not fully developed until 1964. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino ,28 the Supreme Court disallowed a claim instituted against
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1962). This has led one commentator to refer to the doctrine
as judicial abstention from matters of executive prerogative in foreign affairs. See
Delson, The Act of State Doctrine-Judicial Deference or Abstention?, 66 AM. J. INT'L
L. 82 (1972).
22. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 438 (1964).
23. But rather than hear the matter on its merits, the court will presume the validity
of the act, and the issue will therefore not be justiciable. This has the added effect of
precluding the argument that the act violates the public policy of the forum state. See
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 5.
24. Id. at § 41.
25. Id. at § 63.
26. 246 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1918).
27. 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
28. Actually, the claim was filed by Cuba's agent-bank to recover the value of the
sugar from the purchaser who after accepting the sight draft, gave the money to a court
appointed receiver of the assets of the former owners. The purchaser acted pursuant to
an agreement with the former owners in exchange for 10 percent of the proceeds and
indemnification for any judgment for conversion. The Court clearly did not like this self-
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Cuba for expropriation of sugar previously owned by United States
nationals and which had been loaded on a ship lying in Cuban coastal
waters. The Court held that in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, the judicial
branch would not examine the validity of an expropriation of property
by a foreign government within its own territory. This is true even if
the complaint alleged that the taking violated customary international
law. 29 In its opinion, the Court identified five considerations that are
relevant in applying the act of state doctrine to the conduct of foreign
sovereigns: 1) the possibility of embarrassment to the foreign relations of the United States, 30 2) the possibility of affront to the foreign
government, 3 ' 3) uncertainty in international trade, 32 4) ease of
judicial remedy 33 and 5) the degree of codification or concensus
concerning the particular area of international law. 34
The public reaction to the Court's decision in Sabbatino prompted the passage of the Hickenlooper Amendment. 35 It was designed "to
reverse in part the . . . decision of the Supreme Court" 36 in Sabbatino. The language of the amendment limits its application to the
taking of property without compensation. 37 Nevertheless, the principles discussed in Sabbatino have been the controlling criteria in all
subsequent cases, and the analysis of these principles may still be
utilized to assist in resolving the tension between the act of state
doctrine and the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
help approach to getting the res into the United States and refused to allow the defendants to answer with Cuba's conduct.
29. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
30. Id. at 433.
31. Id. at 431-32.
32. Id. at 433.
33. Id. at 431.
34. Id. at 428.
35. 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (e)(2) (1964) (amended 1970).
36. S. REP. No. 1188, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in [19641 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3829, 3852.
37. 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (e)(2) (1970):
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United States
shall decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a
determination on the merits giving effect to the principles of international law
in a case in which a claim of title or other rights to property is asserted by any
party including a foreign state (or a party claiming through such state) based
upon (or traced through) a confiscation or other taking after January 1, 1959,
by an act of that state in violation of the principles of international law,
including the principles of compensation and the other standards set out in this
subsection.
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B. Bernstein Exceptions to the Act of State Doctrine
In order to fully understand Citibank and Dunhill, it is necessary
to examine a purported exception to the doctrine. In Bernstein v. N. V.
Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche,38 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals permitted consideration of a letter written by the Acting Legal
Advisor to the Department of State, who recommended that the act of
state doctrine be denied applicability to the case under review. The
court described the letter as a "supervening expression of Executive
policy" 39 that obviated the requirement to abstain in those matters
covered by the letter that touched upon foreign affairs. Until Citibank,
the Supreme Court had never specifically passed upon the validity of
the Bernstein exception, pointedly avoiding such an opportunity in
Sabbatino where a similar letter also was involved. n°
The importance of determining the weight to be accorded a
Bernstein letter is apparent in the first factor considered relevant by the
Sabbatino court, as discussed above: the possibility of embarrassment
to the foreign relations of the United States. If through such a letter,
the Executive suggests that there will be no embarrassment, what
would prevent a United States court from sitting in judgment on the
matter? 4 1 The answer to this question, in part, focuses upon the
concerns of the minority in Dunhill, which failed to approve the
commercial activity restriction to the act of state doctrine.
C.

The Court's Uncertainty in Citibank
Citibank arose from Castro's nationalization of the branch property of Citibank in Cuba in 1960. In response, Citibank foreclosed on
collateral it held which secured a fifteen million dollar loan that had
been extended to a Cuban business during the previous government.
Banco Nacional de Cuba succeeded to the interests of that business
after it also was nationalized. After the sale of the collateral, there was
1.8 million dollars that exceeded the amount of principal and interest
due on the loan, and Banco Nacional sued for the excess. Citibank
maintained that the value of its property seized in Cuba was greater
than the realized excess and that Citibank was entitled to the money as
38. 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
39. Id. at 376.
40. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 436 (1964).
41. The Sabbatino court commented that
[i]t is highly questionable whether the examination of validity by the judiciary
should depend on an educated guess by the Executive as to probable result and
at any rate, should a prediction be wrong, the Executive might be embarrassed
in its dealings with other countries.
Id. at 436.
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damages in set-off or counterclaim. 4 2 The court of appeals determined
that the nationalization decree was an act of state and refused to permit
the counterclaim.4 3 Citibank appealed to the Supreme Court.
While considering the matter, the Court received a letter from the
Legal Advisor to the State Department, advocating the State Department's view that the act of state doctrine should not be applied in the
case. 4" The Court then remanded the case to the court of appeals for
further consideration of the views expressed in the letter. 45 The Second
Circuit, adhering to its original decision, refused to accept Citibank's
argument that the case was controlled by the Bernstein exception. 4
While not expressly overruling Bernstein, the court limited the case
"to its own peculiar facts", 4 7 and held that the principles of Sabbatino
48
precluded review of Cuba's activities.
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, issuing three
opinions among the majority which outlined the divergent views. 49 A
careful evaluation of Citibank reveals that there were two important
holdings. First, a counterclaim not exceeding the amount sought by a
sovereign plaintiff is not barred by the act of state doctrine as it would
have been if the suit for the counterclaimed amount had been brought
as an original action.50 Second, the Court rejected the so-called Bern51
stein exception by a vote of six to three.
42. First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759,761 (1972).
43. 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970).
44. The letter stated:
The Department of State believes that the act of state doctrine should not be
applied to bar consideration of a defendant's counterclaim or set-off against
the government of Cuba in this or like cases.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank of New York, 442 F.2d 530, 538 (2d
Cir. 1971). •
45. 400 U.S. 1019 (1971).
46. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank of New York, 442 F.2d
530, 535 (2d Cir. 1971).
47. 442 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1971). The "peculiar facts" of Bernstein involved the
transfer of the corporate assets belonging to a German Jew to Nazi officials who
compelled him, while imprisoned, to execute the transfer documents. Bernstein later
sued in the United States for the insurance proceeds held by the German trustee.
Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, 210 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1954).
48. 442 F.2d at 536.
49. 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
50. Id. at 769. The Court quoted from National City Bank v. Republic of China,
348 U.S. 356, (1955):
We have a foreign government invoking our law but resisting a claim against it
which fairly would curtail its recovery. It wants our law, like any other litigant,
but it wants our law free from the claims of justice.
348 U.S. at 361-62. National City Bank v. Republic of China established the counterclaim exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
51. First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
There was the anomalous result that this holding was articulated in the dissenting opinion
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Both of these holdings are important to the subsequent decision in
Dunhill since the Court's holding in Dunhill focused upon the exact
situs of the counterclaimed debt. Moreover, similar issues have arisen
in the area of sovereign immunity and have been resolved.
As will be discussed later, the Department of State now has no
authority over the award of sovereign immunity because recent legislation has reposed the matter in the judiciary.52 Furthermore, National
City Bank v. Republic of China, 3 conclusively established a counter54
claim exception in the field of sovereign immunity.
II.

RECENT STATEMENT OF THE COURT IN DUNHILL

In May of 1976, the Supreme Court announced its decision in
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic-of Cuba .55 This case is the
most recent statement by the Court on the status of the doctrine. The
Court again considered the principles in Sabbatino and requested
briefs and arguments on the question: "Should this Court's holding in
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino5 6 be reconsidered?" '5 7 The
Court was presaging a further restriction upon the act of state doctrine
in light of the views expressed in Citibank. It was with Sabbatino in
mind that the Court considered the case.
By decree, dated September 15, 1960,58 five Cuban companies
which manufactured cigars were nationalized by the Republic of Cuba.
since Justice Douglas and Justice Powell specifically rejected the Bernstein exception in
their concurring opinions and joined the four dissenters on this point.
52. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, § 1604, 90 Stat.
2891 (1976) (to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1604).
53. 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
54. Id. It was Justice Douglas' opinion that Citibank was not controlled by Sabbatino, but by National City Bank v. Republic of China, so long as the amount counterclaimed by Citibank did not exceed the amount of the claim of the plaintiff. For this
reason, he argued that the case fell within a counterclaim exception to the act of state
doctrine. National City Bank v. Republic of China was a similar case in which the
plaintiff sued to recover $200,000 on deposit with Citibank, which the bank refused to
release. Citibank counterclaimed for $1,600,000 in damages based upon two defaulted
issues of China's treasury notes held by the bank. By the time the case reached the
United States Supreme Court, China had dropped its request for a judgment in excess of
the $200,000 on deposit, and the Court permitted the counterclaim based upon "considerations of fair dealing."
An undercurrent of the opinion is that whenever a foreign sovereign brings a suit in a
United States court, there is a partial waiver of claims of immunity to counterclaims
arising from the same circumstances.
55. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
56. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
57. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 690 n.5
(1976).
58. Brief for Petitioner, Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425
U.S. 682 (1976).
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Prior to and for a short time after nationalization, cigars manufactured
by these companies were shipped to three principal importers in the
United States, including Dunhill. Payment for most of the cigars
shipped after the nationalization never was made. After nationalization, however, several payments, intended to cover amounts owed for
pre-nationalization shipments, were made by the importers to the
Cuban agents appointed to manage the nationalized businesses.
A.

Action in the District Court

In early 1961, the former owners of the cigar companies who fled
to the United States sued the importers to obtain payment on all cigars
shipped before and after nationalization. They also sued both the
importers and the Cuban government for infringing their United States
trademarks applicable to the cigars.5 9 The Cuban agents appointed to
60
manage the nationalized businesses, referred to as "interventors",
also sought to recover for all cigars shipped to the importers by
61
attempting to intervene procedurally in the owner's actions.
Since the importers were essentially in the position as stakeholders, the court held the actions against them by the former owners in
abeyance and proceeded to resolve the threshold disputes between the
former owners and the interventors. 62 In so doing, the court held that
the previous owners could prosecute claims for trademark infringement, while the interventors could recover for post-nationalization
shipments. 63 These holdings were affirmed on appeal. 64
Proceeding with the original suits against the importers by the five
previous owners, all the actions then were combined, and the interventors were allowed to intervene procedurally as plaintiffs. 6 The district
court judge ruled that the previous owners were entitled to payment for
the pre-nationalization shipments. 66 The court also ruled that the
59. 425 U.S. at 685.
60. In Latin American law there is a difference between intervention and nationalization. Intervention is where a receiver is appointed to manage for a temporary period, a
business which for some reason cannot continue to function. The law authorizing
intervention can be found in F. Palicio y. Compania, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 375 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied sub nom. Brush v.
Republic of Cuba, 389 U.S. 830 (1967).

61. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 686 (1976).
62. F. Palicio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F.Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), affl'd,
375 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1967).
63. Id. at 486-90.
64. Id.
65. Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F.Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
66. Id. at 540-42.
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interventors had received those payments wrongfully and were liable
under an unjust enrichment theory which required the interventors to
return the payments to the importers.67 The court further held that,
although the payment for pre-nationalization shipments had been made
erroneously to the interventors after nationalization, the importers
were nonetheless liable to the previous owners for those amounts, with
68
interest thereon.
The court instructed that the importers, in turn, could recover
those amounts with interest from the interventors.69 Two of the importers, other than Dunhill, owed larger sums to the interventors than
they had mistakenly paid, and they were permitted to recover these
amounts by way of a set-off. Dunhill, having paid more to the Cuban
government's agents for pre-nationalization shipments than it owed for
post-nationalization shipments, recovered an affirmative judgment
against the interventors for the difference. 70 The sums to pay the
judgment were to be taken out of the net balances deemed owed the
71
interventors by the other importers.
B.

Action in the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the affirmative judgment granted Dunhill on the grounds that Cuba's refusal to
return the mistakenly paid funds was an act of state barring affirmative
relief.72 The interventors argued that there were two acts of state. One
was the original refusal of the Cuban government via its agent bank to
return the funds at issue. The second was the statement of their counsel
7
during the trial that the funds would not be returned .
The second contention need not be addressed because under the
74
traditional application of the doctrine, the first assertion was correct
67. Id. at 536.
68. Id. at 540-42.
69. Id. at 543-44.
70. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 688 (1976).
71. Id.
72. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1371 (2d Cir. 1973).
73. Counsel at trial stated that their clients would refuse to honor any obligations to
make restitution. They argued that such a repudiation constituted an act of state that
precluded judgment against them. Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F.Supp.
527, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
74. It was Cuba's position that the situs of the debt was in Cuba. The debt was in
quasi-contract for unjust enrichment. The refusal of Cuba to repay, whether formally
expressed or not, was an act of state under the holdings of previous cases. See, e.g.,
Bernstein v. van Heyghen Freres, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772
(1947). See also Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas and Oil Co., 331 F.Supp. 92
(C.D. Ca. 1971), affl'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972);
Holzer v. Duetsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, 277 N.Y. 474, 14 N.E.2d 798 (1938).
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although the Supreme Court later found otherwise. Pursuant to the
expropriation decree of 1960, which empowered it to operate all
commercial activities for the state, the agent bank possessed the
authority of the Cuban government to exercise its sovereign powers as
necessary to effectuate the policy and purposes of the nationalization
decree.
Relying upon Citibank, the court of appeals then held that the act
of state doctrine did not bar consideration of the importers' counterclaims against the interventors in an amount that did not exceed the
judgments which the Cuban interventors had previously obtained
against the importers. Thus, the judgment was reversed only as to
Dunhill's affirmative judgment.
C. Decision of the Supreme Court
After hearing arguments twice in this case, the Supreme Court
reversed the court of appeals and approved the affirmative judgment
against the interventors. The Court was closely divided along the same
lines as Citibank.7 5
I. Majority treatment of traditional act of state problem.
Justice White, in his majority opinion, declared that there was no act of
state in the refusal of the interventors to honor their quasi-contract
obligation to repay the money mistakenly paid to them. The Court
accepted the view of the lower courts that the interventors were not
entitled to the payments for the pre-nationalization shipments of
cigars, 76 and that the statement of counsel at trial repudiating their debt
was not an act of state. The Court reasoned that it was the burden of the
interventors to prove the act which represented sovereign conduct
deserving of recognition in United States courts, Mere refusal to return
the money was a natural extension of their litigating position; they had
always been entitled to the money.
The Court went further to point out that there was no evidence to
suggest as operators of a commercial activity, the interventors "had
75. The majority included the Chief Justice and Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist,
and Stephens. Justice Powell separately concurred, as he did in Citibank, and Justice
Stevens concurred partially with the majority, as did Justice Douglas in Citibank.
Similarly, the dissent included Justices Marshall, Stewart, Brennan and Blackmun.
76. The Court relied upon the holding in Republic of Iraq v. First National City
Bank of New York, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966), which
held that United States courts would not give effect to foreign government confiscation
of property located in the United States without compensation to the owners. Since the
situs of the accounts receivable was in the United States, the importers were entitled to
them.
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been invested with the sovereign authority to repudiate all or any part
of the debts incurred by those businesses." 77 The Court concluded its
reasoning on this point by saying:
No statute, decree, order or resolution of the Cuban government itself was offered in evidence indicating that Cuba had
repudiated her obligations in general or any class thereof or
that she had as a sovereign matter determined
to confiscate
78
the amounts due three foreign importers.
It seems clear that the Court for the first time has limited the
operation of the act of state doctrine to statute, decree, order or
resolution. The Court has never before revealed this particular penchant for formally expressed sovereign acts of government when
considering these issues. Without specifically overruling any previous
decisions, the Court ignored what otherwise would have passed for a
sovereign act, and limited the applicability of the doctrine.
2. Proposed commerical activity restriction. In the part of the
opinion not joined by Justice Stevens, 79 Justice White continued to outline the view of four members of the majority that the act of state
doctrine should contain a restriction similar to that which is currently
recognized in the area of sovereign immunity. That restriction, he
argued, would limit the operation of the doctrine to those activities of
the sovereign that can be classified as public acts or jure imperii as
opposed to commercial activities, jure gestionis.8°
The opinion persuasively argued that the operation of the cigar
businesses by the Castro government was a commercial venture and
81
not otherwise connected with the exercise of sovereign authority.
Nothing in our national policy calls on us to recognize as an
act of state a repudiation by Cuba of an obligation adjudicated in our courts and arising out of the operation
of a
82
commercial business by one of its instrumentalities.
77. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 692 (1976).
78. Id. at 695.
79. Justice Stevens joined the majority opinion insofar as the Court found no act of
state .in
the interventors' repudiation of their debt.
80. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695 (1976).
81. Id. at 705. Because the act relied upon by the respondents in this case was an
act arising out of the conduct by Cuba's agents in the operation of cigar businesses for
profit, the act was not an act of state.
The debt would never have arisen if Cuba's agents had not gone into the cigar
business and sold to Dunhill. This case is therefore no different from any case
in which a buyer overpays for goods sold by a commercial business operated
by a foreign government-a commonplace event in international commerce.
Id. at 697 n. 11.
82. Id. at 705.
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Justice White further stated:
Repudiation of a commercial debt cannot, consistent with
this restrictive approach to sovereign immunity, be treated
as an act of state; for if it were, foreign governments, by
merely repudiating the debt before or after its adjudication,
would enjoy an immunity which our government would not
extend them under
prevailing sovereign immunity principles
83
country.
this
in
Supporting his argument, he referred to Sabbatino for the underlying premise of the doctrine which precludes the judiciary from
adjudicating the legality of sovereign acts so as to prevent the embarrassment of the Executive Branch of our government. However, he
argued,
subjecting foreign governments to the rule of law in their
commercial dealings presents a much smaller risk of affronting their sovereignty than would an attempt to pass on the
legality of their governmental acts. In their commercial
capacities, foreign governments do not exercise powers
peculiar to sovereigns. Instead, they exercise only those
powers that can also be exercised by private citizens. Subjecting them in connection with such acts to the same rules
of law that apply to private citizens is unlikely to touch very
sharply on "national nerves",8
This position is supported further by the desirable effect of assuring
"those engaging in commercial transactions with foreign sovereignties
85
that their rights will be determined in the courts whenever possible."
In reaching his conclusion, Justice White acknowledged the influence of a letter written by the Legal Advisor to the Department of State
on November 26, 1975, articulating the department's view that it
would cause the Executive Branch no embarrassment in the conduct of
foreign affairs if the Court were to restrict the act of state doctrine in
the same fashion as sovereign immunity.' Justice White, however,
did not say how much weight he would afford the letter. The dissent
took issue with any tendency of this new Bernstein letter to influence
the decision and referred to the holding of Citibank as set forth in the
dissent there.87
83. Id. at 698-99.
84. Id. at 703-04.
85. Id. at 699.
86. Id. at 698.
87. Id. at 725.
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Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion repeated his position
that the judiciary has a duty to decide for itself whether to defer to the
political branches of government. He quoted from his opinion in
Citibank:
Unless it appears that an exercise of jurisdiction would interfere with delicate foreign relations conducted by the political
branches. I conclude that federal courts have an obligation to
hear cases such as this.'
He has maintained that matters of international dispute can be resolved
by a well developed body of international law applied by domestic
courts unless there is a clear possibility of embarrassment to the
Executive.
In understanding Justice Powell's position in Citibank and in
Dunhill, it is helpful to recall that one of the' relevant considerations
discussed in Sabbatino when applying the act of state doctrine was the
degree of codification or concensus concerning the particular area of
international law. Justice Powell maintained that the best means to
develop a respected body of international law is to employ the domestic courts in deciding these matters as they arise in the international
community.8 9 Although Justice Powell does not disagree with the
principles of Sabbatino, he does question the broad application those
principles have received.9 Rather than apply the rule rigidly, he would
evaluate the relevant considerations expressed in Sabbatino in light of
the original purpose that the act of state doctrine was meant to serve. If
application of the rule would not suit that purpose, then he would leave
the matter to be resolved by the courts. Justice Powell seems to have
struck the proper note on this issue, and his views are useful.
3. The dissent. The dissent's opinion was written by Justice
Marshall, who took the view that although the statement of counsel
during the trial was not the act of state, it was proper and authoritative
to characterize the refusal to return mistakenly paid monies as a
sovereign act. He addressed the majority position by saying that an act
of state need not be found only in a "statute, decree, order or resolution. -91
Justice Marshall continued to discuss Justice White's contention
that even if the Cuban government had exercised sovereign power in
88. First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 775-76
(1972).
89. Id. at 775.
90. Id. at 774.
91. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 718-19
(1976).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol7/iss3/12

14

Maier: Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. V. Republic of Cuba: The Act of St
CALIFORNIA WESTERN

INTERNATIONAL

Vol. 7

LAW JOURNAL

this case, the act of state doctrine should not be extended to include
repudiation of purely commercial obligations owed by them. Without
enumerating, Justice Marshall argued that there are important and
fundamental differences between sovereign immunity and the act of
state doctrine.9 2 He then pointed out that to draft consistent rules that
distinguish the public and private acts of government has proved very
difficult. "[A]ny broad exception to the act of state doctrine within the
confines of a single case. . . is fundamentally at odds with the careful
93
case-by-case approach adopted in Sabbatino."
The dissent was adamant in arguing that even under a commercial/noncommercial test, there was no escape from the conclusion that
Cuba's repudiation of its debt was consistent and in conjunction with
its original expropriation decree and, therefore, not a commercial act
of the sovereign. Cuba maintained that when the expropriation decree
was issued, they legitimately seized assets pursuant to Cuban law. Part
of those assets were the accounts receivable on pre-nationalization
cigar shipments. It was their position that the situs of the debt was in
Cuba and not with the former owners, who were, by then, in the
United States.
The lower court found the facts controlled by Republic of Iraq v.
First National City Bank,' which held that the situs of the accounts
receivable was with the importer-debtors. Then, under United States
law, there was a quasi-contract obligation of Cuba to repay the monies
mistakenly paid them by the importers; Cuba's course of conduct in
refusing to pay was most certainly an act of state. The majority clearly
limited the act of state doctrine to a definable statute, decree, order or
resolution.
III.

IMPORTANCE OF DUNHILL AND THE FUTURE OF THE

ACT

OF STATE DOCTRINE

By its action in Dunhill, the Court has found a temporary solution
to the problem presented in the beginning of this Note. Cuba, through
its actions as a sovereign engaged in the business of manufacturing and
selling cigars, attempted to repudiate a commercial obligation incurred
92. Id. at 726.
93. Id. at 728. The argument was further advanced by pointing out that under the
Cuban Assets Control Regulation, 31 C.F.R. Part 515 (1963), promulgated by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control pursuant to the Trading With The
Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 5 (1917), it was not possible for Dunhill to execute his
judgment against the amounts found owing by his fellow importers for post-intervention
shipments.
94. 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
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as a result of its management of the cigar firms. Unquestionably, the
picture is clouded by the political ramifications of the initial expropriation. Beyond that, the debt would not have occurred had Cuba not
assumed responsibility for the commercial enterprise.
If Cuba had attempted to seek immunity from Dunhill's counterclaim, under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, it would have been
denied for a number of reasons. First, the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity will not allow a state to seek immunity from suit
for conduct arising from its commercial activities. 95 Second, a counterclaim is not immune, regardless of the amount, so long as it arises
from the same subject matter as that sued upon.96 Third, the doctrine
cannot be invoked after the merits of the controversy have been placed
in issue. 97 Yet, Cuba would seek to fashion a new cloak of immunity
by labeling the repudiation of its debt an act of state.
There are two questions that must be resolved. First, there is the
threshold problem of whether there should be a commercial restriction
under the act of state doctrine similar to that under the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. The injustice that could occur is apparent in cases
where the court, having jurisdiction to settle a dispute, instead defers
to the act of state doctrine, which favors political solutions to this class
of disputes. As a result, the court raised a bar even in the face of
executive encouragement to resolve the matter judicially.
Justice Powell is of the view that there should be judicial resolution of all international disputes in which the courts have jurisdiction,
except those instances in which the Executive will be embarrassed in
its foreign policy efforts. 98 The rest of the plurality would seek only a
restriction in commercial matters. This view did not capture the majority vote. Nevertheless, if Justice Stevens, who expressed no opinion on
this issue, or one of the dissenters is able to adopt a commercial
exception to the doctrine after further study, then a major step will
95. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, § 1605 (a)(2), 90
Stat. 2891 (1976) (to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(2)); Victory Transport, Inc. v.
Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965). See
generally RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 5, at § 69.

-

96. Dexter & Carpenter v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930);
Kingdom of Norway v. Federal Sugar Refining Co., 286 F. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1923);
Mexicon v. Rask, 118 Cal. App. 21, 4 P.2d 981 (1931); Et Ve Balik Kurumun v. B.N.S.
International Sales Corp., 25 Misc.2d 299, 204 N.Y.S. 2d 971, (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1960),
aff'd, 17 A.D.2d 929,233 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (1962). See generally RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW, supra note 5, at § 70(2)(b).
97. See generally RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 5, at
§ 71(1).
98. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 715 (1976)
(Powell, J., concurring).
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be taken towards ensuring order in the determination of liability in
international commerce.
The dissenters, however, expressed concern that a distinction
could not be drawn easily between commercial and public acts of a
sovereign. 9 This poses the second query of whether such a distinction
can be drawn. In the following subsection, proposals that have been
advanced in the area of sovereign immunity will be examined for their
applicability to the act of state doctrine.
A. Sovereign Immunity and the Commercial Restriction
As previously discussed, the legal development of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity in the United States can be traced to Schooner
Exchange v. M'Faddon,10 an opinion authored by Chief Justice Marshall. Sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional concept that accords a
defendant exemption from suit by virtue of his status. In contrast, the
act of state doctrine exempts no one from the process of the court. It is
applicable whether or not a sovereign nation is a party.
In 1952, the Legal Advisor to the department of State, Jack B.
Tate, formally announced that the department would recognize the
immunity of the sovereign "with regard to sovereign or public acts,
but not with regard to private acts." 011 Since that time, federal courts
have followed this restrictive theory, except in those cases where the
102
State Department has intervened with a "suggestion of immunity".
The Supreme Court, however, has never expressly adopted the restriction. t0
1. Inquiry into purpose of the state act. The most important
case implementing the restrictive theory has come from the Second
99. Id. at 728.
100. I1 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116(1812).
101. 26 DEP'T OF STATE BULL, 984 (1954), also reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711 (1976) (appendix 2 to majority
opinion).
The restrictive theory has its foundations in the widespread and increasing
practice on the part of governments of engaging in commercial activities
[which] makes necessary a practice which will enable persons doing business
with them to have their rights determined in the courts.
Id. at 985.
102. For a thorough and authoritative analysis of this process, see Lowenfeld,
Litigating a Sovereign Immunity Claim-The Haiti Case, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 377 (1974).
103. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 725 (1976)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) When given the opportunity to embrace the restrictive theory,
the Supreme Court refused, unanimously reversing the court of appeal in Berizzi Bros.
Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926). That holding, however, has been diminished by
the subsequent decisions in Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943), and Mexico v. Hoffman,
324 U.S. 30 (1945).
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Circuit Court of Appeals case, Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria
General."°4 In that case there was a charter between the plaintiff and
the defendant sovereign to ship grain. A dispute arose, and the plaintiff
petitioned the court to compel the defendant to arbitrate in accordance
with a clause in the charter. The defendant claimed its immunity from
suit as a sovereign. The court, in considering the implications of the
State Department's position, as expressed in the Tate letter, 0 5 found
that it was necessary to develop a standard distinguishing acts jure
imperii and acts jure gestionis. The State Department letter had
offered no guidance in this respect. The problem was resolved by
examining the purpose" ° for which the charter was entered. Finding
no governmental purpose to the charter, the court granted the petition. 107
2. Inquiry into the nature of the state act. An alternative discussed and rejected in Victory Transport was one that would distinguish governmental acts on the basis of their nature. 18 Such analysis
104. 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965). See Ocean
Transport Co. v. Ivory Coast, 269 F.Supp. 703 (E.D. La. 1967); Petrol Shipping Corp. v.
Kingdom of Greece Ministry of Com., 360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
931 (1966); Pan Am. Tankers Corp. v. Vietnam, 291 F.Supp. 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Premier Steamship Co. v. Embassy of Algeria, 336 F.Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
105. See note 101 supra.
106. The court said:
We are disposed to deny a claim of sovereign immunity that has not been
"recognized and allowed" by the State Department unless it is plain that the
activity in question fails within one of the categories of strictly political or
public acts about which sovereigns have traditionally been quite sensitive.
Such acts are generally limited to the following categories:
(I) internal administrative acts, such as expulsion of an alien;
(2) legislative acts, such as nationalization;
(3) acts concerning the armed forces;
(4) acts concerning diplomatic activity; and
(5) public loans.
336 F.2d at 360. This list comes from the frequently cited analysis by the Swiss writer,
Professor Lalive, developing the view that the purpose of the governmental activity must
justify the grant of immunity. Lalive, L'immunite' de jurisdiction des Etats et des
Organizations Internationales. 3 RUCUEIL DES COURS 205, 285-86 (1953).
107. Id. at 360:
The purpose of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity is to try to
accomodate the interests of individuals doing business with foreign governments in having their legal rights determined by the courts, with the interests
of foreign governments in being free to perform certain political acts without
undergoing the embarrassment or hindrance of defending the propriety of such
actions before foreign courts.
Victory Transport was affirmed later in Heaney v. Gov't of Spain, 445 F.2d 501 (2d Cir.
1971). The dictum in Victory Transport later became the holding of Aerotrade v. Haiti,
376 F. Supp. 1281 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
108. An early discussion of the nature of the transaction test can be found in Weiss,
Competence ou Incompetance des Tribunaux a I' Egard des Etas Etrangers, I RECUEIL
DES COURS 521, 546 (1923). Professor Lalive expressly disagreed with Weiss because,
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would examine whether the government acted via formal decree,
resolution, legislative act, or contract. In rejecting this examination,
the court said:
While this criterion is relatively easy to apply, it ofttimes
produces rather astonishing results, such as the holding of
some European courts that purchases of the bullets or shoes
for the army, the erection of fortifications for defense, or the
rental of a house for an embassy, are private acts. Furthermore, this test merely postpones the difficulty, for particular
contracts in some instances may be made only by states." °
It would appear that as between the nature of the act test and the
purpose of the act test, there would be greater likelihood of offense to
the foreign sovereign if the court were to make the preliminary inquiry
into the purpose of the sovereign act than if the court were to examine
its nature. Looking to the example posed by the court in Victory
Transport, a government may breach a contract to purchase boots.
Yet, it would appear to touch more sharply on national nerves to
require, as a prelude to a grant of immunity, that the sovereign reveal
that it intends the boots for its army encamped on a tense border, than
it would to view the transaction as commercial and assess liability for
the breach.
3. Legislation codifying the restrictive theory.
The United
States Congress recently passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976,11 ° which states in part:

Subject to existing international agreements to which
the United States is a party at the time of enactment of this
Act a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of
the courts of the United States and of the States except as
provided in sections 1605-1607 of this chapter ...
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial
activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state;
or upon an act performed in the United States in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or
upon an act outside the territory of the United States in
among other reasons, under a test that focuses on the nature or character of the act, suits
on some military purchases might be permitted. See Lalive, supra note 106.
109. 336 F.2d at 359. The court apparently had in mind the classic quandry discussed
by commentators involving contracts by a sovereign to purchase shoes for the army.
Lowenfeld, supra note 102, at 422n.183. If viewed as a contract, the nature of the act
would permit adjudication of the dispute in foreign courts. This - astonishing result"
would be avoided if the purpose for the contract were the deciding factor and if military
purchases were considered public acts of the sovereign.
110. Pub. L. No. 94-583 § 1604, 1605(a)(2), 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (to be codified in 28

U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605(a)(2)).
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connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United

States.1 1
The phrase "commercial
meaning:

activity"

is defined under the Act as

(d) . . .either a regular course of commercial conduct or a
particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial
character of an activity shall be determined by reference to
the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction
or act, rather than by reference to its purpose.
(e) A "commercial activity carried on in the United States

by a foreign state" means commercial activity carried on by
such state and having substantial contact with the United
States. I12

Under this legislation, all responsibility for granting immunity
from suit would reside in the judiciary, thereby freeing the Department
of State from the pressures of foreign states to intervene in lawsuits
with a suggestion of immunity. In adopting this measure, the Congress
intended that if a private person could have entered into the transaction, the nature of the act is private. The act is regarded as public in
113
nature only if it could not be performed by a private person.
If the terms of this legislation were to be applied to the facts in
Dunhill, the commercial nature of Cuba's conduct is unmistakable.
The purpose of the enactment is to render the sovereign-merchant
subject to the same rule of law as private parties. In the area of
sovereign immunity, the international community places the decision
14
to grant immunity exclusively within the discretion of the court.
I1l. Id. at §§ 1604, 1605(a)(2) (emphasis added).
112. Id. at §§ 1603(d), 1603(e) (emphasis added).
113. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976), reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604. In this analysis of the legislative history, the report
reads:
At the other end of the spectrum, a single contract, if of the same character as
a contract which might be made by a private person, could constitute a
"particular transaction or act."
As the definition indicates, the fact that goods or services to be procured
through a contract are to be used for a public purpose is irrelevant; it is the
essentially commercial nature of an activity or transaction that is critical.
Thus, a contract by a foreign government to buy provisions or equipment for
its armed forces or to construct a government building constitutes a commercial activity. The same would be true of a contract to make repairs on an
embassy. building. Such contracts should be considered to be commercial
contracts, even if their ultimate object is to further a public function.
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD NEWS 6615. Compare Id. with Victory Transport Inc. v.
Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354, 359 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
114. European Convention on State Immunity, done May 16, 1972, ch. I, art. 1-14,
reprinted in I I INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 470-89 (1972), in which thirteen distinct occur-
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The question posed earlier was whether a distinction could be
drawn between public and private acts of a sovereign. This question
can be answered in the affirmative because it is clear that workable
rules for each have been codified in the area of sovereign immunity. It
is now necessary to see if these rules can be applied to the act of state
doctrine.
B.

Proposalfor Commercial Limitation to the Act
of State Doctrine

The dissenters in Dunhill argued, without further elaborating,
that although both the act of state doctrine and the sovereign immunity
doctrine share a respect for sovereign states, nevertheless, they serve
important policies independent of one another. 1 15 If the five factors
considered relevant by the Sabbatino court are examined in the light of
the proposed commercial restriction, it can be demonstrated that the
important policies supporting the act of state doctrine would not be
compromised.
1. The possibility of embarrassment to the foreign relations of
the United States would be minimized because the Department of State
has officially promulgated this policy through its endorsement by letter
of the commercial exception in Dunhill, 16 and adjudication in conformity with that position would not conflict with the foreign policy
objectives of the Executive.
2. The adjudication of a commercial claim against a foreign
state on the merits would not affront the sovereignty of a foreign nation
because sovereignty, as such, is not implicated in such an adjudication. The foreign state appears in the marketplace as a merchant, not as
a sovereign, and it is as a merchant that the foreign state is adjudged
liable for its commercial obligation.
3. Uncertainty in international trade would be minimized by the
assurance that a contractual breach would be treated no differently for
sovereigns than for private parties. The prospect of a naked repudiation
of a commercial debt, such as was seen in Dunhill, would diminish
with the certainty that liability would be assessed in a court of law.
4. With Dunhill as an example, an easier judicial remedy to the
breach could not be found. Whatever the difficulties in execution,
rances that exclude a plea of sovereign immunity are enumerated. See Lauterpacht, The
Problem of JurisdictionImmunities of Foreign States, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 118,123-30
(1938).
115. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 726 (1976)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 706 (appendix 1).
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judgment should not be precluded.
5. There is concensus evidenced in all national legal systems for
the establishment of a stable legal solution to problems arising in
international commerce. 11 7 The existence of fundamental differences
in these solutions would pose the danger of insecurity and uncertainty
in the conduct of foreign trade. Thus, as was said in The Paquete
Havana," 8 international law "is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
'1 19
presented for their determination."
Applying the principles of Sabbatino, it is clear that the commercial restriction to the act of state doctrine proposed by the plurality is
not at odds with the policies underlying the doctrine. Yet, the dissenters interposed another objection. Justice Marshall relied upon his
assertion that there have been difficulties encountered in drafting rules
distinguishing public from private acts of government, however, he
offered no examples of the evils that can accompany an imprecise
distinction. It is possible that Justice Marshall was considering Rich v.
Naviera Vacuba,"2 ° in which a merchant ship was libeled for injuries,
back wages, and compensation for wharfside services and goods. The
libelants relied on the Tate letter and its commercial activity restriction, but the Department of State filed a suggestion of immunity in
spite of the commercial character of the dispute. As it developed, Cuba
had returned a hijacked plane the day before the suit was filed upon a
promise from the United States to relinquish vessels illegally brought
into the country. 21 Under the new legislation governing sovereign
immunity, the result of Naviera could not happen again because the
Department of State would have no authority to "suggest
12 2
immunity".
117. See Rajski, The Law of InternationalTrade of Some European Socialist Countries and East-West Trade Relations, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 125, 137.
118.
119.
120.
121.

175 U.S. 677 (1900).
Id. at 700.
295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
See generally I A. Chayes, T. Erlich and A. Lowenfeld, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
PROCESS 87-144 (1968).

These facts give significance to Justice Douglas' vigorous repudiation of the Bernstein exception in his concurring opinion to Citibank, where he objected that by accepting controlling guidance from the Department of State in these matters, "the Court
becomes a mere errand boy for the Executive which may choose to pick some people's
chestnuts from the fire but not others." 406 U.S. 759, 772 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
122. This new development was applauded by Monroe Leigh, the Legal Advisor to
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The existence of such policy mistakes does not suggest that
precise distinctions cannot be drawn between public and private acts.
A more compelling and troublesome example can be found in a
hypothetical situation involving United States petroleum imports. Suppose the import of foreign oil were the subject of contract between
domestic oil distributors and oil exporting nations. Such an arrangement, under this theory, would be deemed a commercial activity by a
foreign sovereign. In the event of an oil embargo, could it reasonably
be postulated that a failure to tender conforming goods would be a
repudiation of a commercial obligation owed by the sovereign-merchant? Most likely an embargo would be viewed as a political act
performed by a foreign state to achieve certain national goals. Perhaps
this is an example of an evil that would attend a commercial restriction
to the act of state doctrine and which disturbed Justice Marshall in his
Dunhill dissent.
On its face, such a situation would require the full application of
the traditional act of state doctrine. However, the trading partners of a
sovereign-merchant contract are entitled to no less protection from
breach than they enjoy from a merchant-merchant contract. Moreover,
private merchants are not entitled to reciprocal immunity from suit
instituted by sovereign merchants for breach. Therefore, if the facts
were reversed and the private merchant where to breach his bargain with
a sovereign merchant, he would enjoy no immunity from suit for his
breach under any circumstances. It is suggested that the same restriction which applies now in sovereign immunity situations, apply to
situations where the act of state doctrine would be applicable.
IV.

CONCLUSION

If the courts refuse to adjudicate claims on the ground that they
cannot question a foreign sovereign's repudiation of its obligations,
international trade between United States businesses and foreign governments is destined to be stifled. The courts of the United States
effectively would be closed as a means of redress for any breach of an
obligation committed by the foreign sovereign. Yet, our courts would
be open to the foreign sovereign, enabling them to enforce the obligations of the United States business which arose out of the same
commercial transaction.
The presence of sovereign merchants in the international marketplace is continually increasing. International trade and commerce has
increased dramatically between United States nationals and foreign
the State Department, in his discussion of a similar case. Leigh, Sovereign ImmunityThe Case of the "Imias", 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 280 (1974).
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governments acting in a commercial capacity.' 2 3 This trade is of great
importance to the United States economy. If international trade is to
continue to prosper, it is essential to assure merchants that contractual
obligations voluntarily undertaken by foreign governments and quasigovernmental bodies, such as Banco Nacional de Cuba, will not be
lightly nullified. If a government entity is allowed to state that it
simply will not pay its debts arising out of its commercial activities and
thereby avoid liability, sovereign immunity will have been reestablished on a different and far reaching foundation. Permitting such a
repudiation would constitute a significant deterrant to international
trade.
Steven P. Maier
123. International Economic Report of the President, 11 WEEKLY COMP.
DOc., 291 (Mar. 20, 1975).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol7/iss3/12

OF PRES.

24

